Short-Term Deals, Long-Term Consequences: Why Trump’s Middle East Strategy May Backfire

By Dr. Tim Orr

Donald Trump’s Middle East diplomacy looked like a triumph in a world driven by headlines and election cycles. Trump’s Middle East diplomacy included a $142 billion arms deal with Saudi Arabia, a $200 billion Boeing purchase agreement with Qatar, and significant defense and technology partnerships with the UAE (The Times, 2025). These moves were celebrated with high-profile ceremonies, formal summits, and smiling photo ops with Gulf leaders. For many Americans, it felt like a return to strength and a masterclass in deal-making. But if we take a closer look—especially through the lens of Bernard Lewis, one of the 20th century’s foremost scholars on Islamic civilization—those victories may be far more hollow than they appear. Worse, they may help advance the very Islamist ideologies the West has spent decades trying to contain.

The Sacred Timeline vs. the Secular Clock

One of Lewis’s key insights is that Islamist movements operate on a fundamentally different time understanding. History is often viewed in the West as a straight line—past, present, progress. It’s governed by Enlightenment ideals, where each generation seeks improvement and moves beyond religious or historical baggage (Lewis, 2003). But in the Islamist imagination, time is sacred. The past is not discarded—it’s destiny.

Events like the Hijra or the Rashidun Caliphate are not just milestones—they’re blueprints. The fall of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924 wasn’t the end of an era; it was a rupture in divine order, and Islamist movements have spent the last century seeking to reverse it. They don’t rush. They don’t forget. And they don’t need the West’s approval. For many Islamists, time is cyclical and eschatological—history is God’s unfolding plan, and their role is to be faithful stewards of that destiny.

This is why short-term setbacks don’t shake them. Losing a battle, facing sanctions, enduring isolation—all of it is temporary. As Lewis puts it, “Islamists wait in the certainty of ultimate victory” (Lewis, 2003, p. 34). Their resilience is not strategic alone—it’s theological. Western policymakers often fail to grasp this because they project their values: peace, prosperity, and public approval. But Islamists define victory by faithfulness, not popularity.

Trump’s Model: The Deal as the Goal

Donald Trump’s approach to negotiation, as outlined in The Art of the Deal, is all about momentum, leverage, and perception. Success is immediate, measurable, and public. The biggest deals make the biggest headlines. There’s no sacred vision—just strategy. While this may be effective in the boardroom or domestic policy, it is deeply mismatched when applied to a region where identity is theological, not just national (Trump, 1987).

Trump’s Middle East deals focused on arms sales, trade partnerships, and temporary diplomatic wins, such as the $142 billion weapons deal with Saudi Arabia and the normalization agreements forged through the Abraham Accords (The Times, 2025; Reuters, 2025). But they lacked depth. They rarely addressed the ideological frameworks guiding the region’s most dangerous actors. These frameworks often include a theological vision for re-establishing Islamic governance (sharīʿa), rejecting Western secularism, and resisting the legitimacy of Israel and liberal democracies. Movements like the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafi-jihadist groups, and Iran’s clerical regime are animated by this worldview, which prioritizes divine mandate over diplomatic pragmatism. In fact, by sidelining Israel and favoring Gulf regimes, Trump may have emboldened ideologies that reject both American liberalism and Jewish sovereignty outright.

The Gulf’s Hidden Agenda: Using the West to Fund the Future

Let’s look at the numbers. Saudi Arabia received $142 billion in arms agreements. Qatar inked a $200 billion Boeing deal. The UAE gained access to Western defense and tech networks (The Times, 2025). But all of these nations have either funded or turned a blind eye to Islamist networks. Qatar has notoriously supported the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas and hosted leaders with ties to al-Qaeda-linked groups like al-Nusra (UK Parliament Committees, 2017). These groups are not just political actors—they are rooted in militant ideologies that reject Western democratic norms, promote global jihad, and seek the re-establishment of Islamic governance. Their access to political legitimacy and funding through state partnerships significantly amplifies their long-term impact and ideological reach. Saudi citizens have channeled billions into extremist charities, and even the UAE—despite its slick modernization—has supported Salafi movements abroad.

These regimes know how to play both sides. They cozy up to the West when it brings money or weapons, using those resources to extend their influence in Africa, Southeast Asia, and even Western universities. Through mosques, charities, and think tanks, they are funding a quiet ideological revival—not toward liberal democracy, but toward Islamic revivalism. For instance, organizations like the International Union of Muslim Scholars and networks tied to the Muslim Brotherhood have used educational and religious outreach to promote a vision of Islamic governance and resistance to secularism across Europe and parts of Africa.

What’s worse? These regimes are now seen as "moderates." That label gives them breathing room, disarms Western critics, and allows them to build the infrastructure for long-term influence without accountability.

Excluding Israel: The Clearest Warning Sign

Perhaps the most alarming signal in all of this is who was left out. Israel, America’s strongest and most stable ally in the region, was sidelined from key negotiations, including discussions with Iran and Hamas, diplomatic dialogues surrounding the Abraham Accords, and even U.S.-brokered hostage release talks—forums where its strategic interests should have been front and center. Israeli officials were not present in discussions with Iran and Hamas. They were bypassed in Gulf diplomacy. Even in hostage negotiations, Israel was left on the sidelines (Reuters, 2025).

Why does that matter? Because in Islamist theology, two enemies must be overcome for Islam to rise again: Israel and the United States. These aren’t just political opponents—they are theological obstructions. Israel represents the return of Jewish sovereignty over land once ruled by Islam, and the U.S. is seen as the patron of global secularism and Christian power. Many Islamist thinkers believe that Islamic civilization cannot be restored until these two powers are either neutralized or expelled.

So when Trump excludes Israel from negotiations while enriching the Gulf, he’s not just making a political misstep—he’s inadvertently confirming the narrative of Islamist ideologues: that the West is retreating, that the caliphate can return, and that time is on their side.

How Short-Term Deals Fulfill Long-Term Goals

This is the strategic heart of the issue: in the Muslim world, short-term deals are not ends—they’re means. Bernard Lewis warned that Islamist actors view temporary truces (hudna) not as peace agreements, but as tactical pauses. Hamas, for instance, has repeatedly signed ceasefires—not to make peace with Israel, but to regroup, rearm, and reinforce its ideological base. Their charter remains unchanged. Their vision is not coexistence—it’s conquest (Lewis, 2003).

Short-term economic partnerships serve the same function. Western countries fund Islamist charities, media platforms, educational institutions, and even cyber operations. For instance, Al Jazeera—funded by the Qatari government—has been used not only as a media outlet but as a soft-power tool to amplify Islamist narratives. Additionally, organizations like Islamic Relief Worldwide have faced scrutiny for alleged ties to extremist networks, despite receiving support from Western governments and institutions. Regimes use U.S. technology to suppress dissent and export Islamic messaging. The West celebrates “modernization,” but what’s happening is the modernization of Islamist strategy—faster communications, broader reach, and better tools for influence.

And it works because Western leaders are impatient. We want visible results. We celebrate when violence slows or when a handshake photo is released. But Islamist leaders are playing a longer game. Their victories are invisible to us, but obvious to them. For example, after the 2012 ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, Western leaders celebrated a pause in hostilities, while Hamas used the time to rebuild its tunnels, restock weapons, and strengthen ties with regional backers—advancing its long-term objectives under the cover of short-term calm. Every deal signed without values, every ally abandoned, every concession made to appease is seen as a step closer to divine victory.

A Clash of Frameworks: Theology vs. Tactics

Ultimately, this is not a battle of interests—it’s a battle of frameworks. The West negotiates with the assumption that all sides want prosperity, safety, and global recognition. But Islamists want none of that if it comes at the cost of Islamic identity and religious sovereignty.

As Lewis observed, movements like the Muslim Brotherhood, Iran’s clerics, and al-Qaeda aren’t driven by economics. They’re driven by theology. The Brotherhood’s slogan is “Islam is the solution”—not capitalism, democracy, or diplomacy. Khomeini reminded his followers, “We did not make this revolution to lower the price of melons.” Inflation reports or public opinion polls do not move these leaders. They are moved by what God demands (Lewis, 2003).

And that’s the danger of Trump’s Art of the Deal strategy in the Middle East. It’s based on leverage, speed, and optics. But these adversaries aren’t looking for a deal. They’re looking for destiny.

Conclusion: The Cost of Misreading the Map

Bernard Lewis once summed it up this way: “They have time. We have watches.” This phrase, often cited by Bernard Lewis, is a well-known regional proverb. Lewis frequently referenced it to illustrate the asymmetry between Western impatience and Islamist endurance (Lewis, 2003). That’s more than a proverb—it’s a prophetic warning. If the West continues to mistake patience for passivity, or see short-term deals as final victories, it will be outmaneuvered by movements that measure success in centuries, not years.

Trump’s deals may have pleased donors and dominated headlines, with favorable media coverage at the time highlighting the agreements' economic scale and diplomatic novelty. Polling conducted by Pew Research Center in 2020 showed that most Republicans supported Trump's foreign policy approach, including his handling of the Middle East (Pew Research Center, 2020). But they also sidelined Israel, empowered dubious allies, and failed to address the ideological engine behind Islamist strategy. In the long run, that’s not a deal—it’s a disaster waiting to unfold.

References

Lewis, B. (2003). The crisis of Islam: Holy war and unholy terror. Modern Library.

Trump, D. J. (1987). The art of the deal. Random House.

Reuters. (2025, May 14). Bypassed by Trump, Israel dismayed. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/bypassed-by-trump-israel-dismayed-silent-2025-05-14

The Times. (2025). Trump’s Gulf deals raise strategic questions. https://www.thetimes.co.uk

UK Parliament Committees. (2017). Foreign affairs committee written evidence: Qatar and terrorism. https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/87421/pdf/

Who is Dr. Tim Orr?

Tim serves full-time with Crescent Project as the assistant director of the internship program and area coordinator, where he is also deeply involved in outreach across the UK. A scholar of Islam, Evangelical minister, conference speaker, and interfaith consultant, Tim brings over 30 years of experience in cross-cultural ministry. He holds six academic degrees, including a Doctor of Ministry from Liberty University and a Master’s in Islamic Studies from the Islamic College in London.

In addition to his ministry work, Tim is a research associate with the Congregations and Polarization Project at the Center for the Study of Religion and American Culture at Indiana University Indianapolis. His research interests include Islamic antisemitism, American Evangelicalism, and Islamic feminism. He has spoken at leading universities and mosques throughout the UK—including Oxford University, Imperial College London, and the University of Tehran—and has published widely in peer-reviewed Islamic academic journals. Tim is also the author of four books. Media coverage at the time highlighted the agreements' economic scale and diplomatic novelty. Polling conducted by Pew Research Center in 2020 showed that most Republicans supported Trump's foreign policy approach, including his handling of the Middle East (Pew Research Center, 2020). But they also sidelined Israel, empowered dubious allies, and failed to address the ideological engine behind Islamist strategy. In the long run, that’s not a deal—it’s a disaster waiting to unfold.